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Struggle in the Neoliberal Mining Regime 
Alvin A. Camba
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mining regime. ASEAS – Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Studies, 9(1), 69-86. 
This article analyzes how the mining sector and anti-mining groups compete for mining 
outcomes in the Philippines. I argue that the transition to a neoliberal mineral regime has 
empowered the mining sector and weakened anti-mining groups by shifting the terrains 
of struggle onto the domains of state agencies and industry networks. Since the neolib-
eral era, the mining sector has come up with two strategies. First, technologies of subjection 
elevate various public institutions to elect and select the processes aimed at making the 
mining sector accountable and sensitive to the demands of local communities. However, 
they often refuse or lack the capacity to intervene effectively. Second, technologies of sub-
jectivities allow a selective group of industry experts to single-handedly determine the 
environmental viability of mining projects. Mining consultants, specialists, and scientists 
chosen by mining companies determine the potential environmental damage on water 
bodies, air pollution, and soil erosion. Because of the mining capital’s access to economic 
and legal resources, anti-mining communities across the Philippines have been forced to 
compete on an unequal terrain for a meaningful social dialogue and mining outcomes.




The Philippines, with natural resources valued at almost USD 1 trillion, ranks 
fifth in the world in terms of mineral resources: third in terms of gold reserves, 
fourth in copper, fifth in nickel, and sixth in chromite (Philippine Rural Recon-
struction Movement, 2010). This article analyzes how mining sector and anti-
mining groups compete for mining outcomes.1 Even though the Philippine min-
eral industry has occupied a central role in the economy since the beginning of 
the 20th century (Camba, 2015), the nature of these contentions has changed 
during the neoliberal era. While previous works have focused on the develop-
mental potential of the mining sector (Rovillos, Ramo, & Corpuz, 2003; Rovil-
1 Mining outcomes pertain to many overlapping and possible scenarios but often encompass the 
following: whether or not communities in the mining areas – in local Philippine towns called the ba-
rangay or indigenous peoples groups – are given a voice to allow mining operations, fair compensa-
tion for the destruction of livelihoods and environments, employment and services for the commu-
nities and protection from harassments and legal threats. The mining sector includes transnational 
and local mining companies, national government agencies, and at times local government actors. 
Anti-mining groups consist of social movements, people’s organizations, and local communities in 
the mining area.
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los  & Tauli-Corpuz, 2012; Santos & Zaratan, 1997), social movement mobilization 
against the mining sector (Holden & Jacobson, 2007a), state violence on anti-mining 
communities (Holden, 2005; Holden & Jacobson, 2007b), the political economy of the 
mining sector (Camba, 2015; Gomez, 2012; Hatcher, 2014; Israel, 2010, 2011; Orfenio, 
2009), local mineral governance (Holden, 2012; La Vina, de Leon, & Bueta, 2012), and 
everyday forms of resistance against mining projects (Nem Singh & Camba, 2016), 
there has been relatively little discussion on the shifting terrains of contention where 
disputes between the mining sector and anti-mining groups take place. 
I argue that the transition to a neoliberal mineral regime has empowered the min-
ing sector and weakened the anti-mining groups by shifting the terrains of struggle 
from protest in the streets into the domains of state agencies and industry networks. 
During the colonial (1901 to 1941), national (1945 to 1964), and authoritarian (1965 to 
1985) mineral regimes, anti-mining communities across the Philippines resisted the 
state and mining capital’s imperative to incorporate mineral lands into the circuits 
of extraction.2 However, during the neoliberal era (1986-present), the mining sector 
devised two strategies to forward its economic interests. First, technologies of subjec-
tion elevate public institutions, such as the Mining Government Bureau (MGB), the 
National Commission for Indigenous Communities (NCIP), and the Department of 
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) to elect and select the processes aimed 
at making mining accountable and sensitive to the demands of local communities. 
Though some branches of these institutions want to intervene to help local commu-
nities, they often refuse or lack the capacity. Second, technologies of subjectivities allow 
a selective group of industry experts to single-handedly determine the environmen-
tal viability of mining projects with no oversight. Mining consultants, specialists, and 
scientists chosen by mining companies determine the potential environmental dam-
age on water bodies, air pollution, and soil erosion. Because of the mining capital’s 
access to economic and legal resources, anti-mining communities across the Philip-
pines have been forced to compete on an inherently unequal terrain for a meaningful 
social dialogue and mining outcomes. 
I use what Aihwa Ong (2006) calls “neoliberal exceptions” to refer to how states 
in the Global South deviate from their usual practices of governing in order to be-
come more attractive investment destinations and legitimate players in the global 
economy. Postcolonial states transform their often inefficient and rent-seeking gov-
ernment agencies into capable and effective ones in order to implement neoliberal 
policies. These agencies become “exceptions” from conventional governing princi-
ples and administration standards across the country. As a result of these changes, 
protest tactics have not only been inhibited by capital-intensive mineral extraction 
but also hindered by institutional constraints, diminishing the effectiveness of their 
anti-mining mobilizations and campaign efforts. To effectively compete for mining 
outcomes, the opponents of mining projects need to contest the implementation of 
the neoliberal mining frameworks on institutional grounds: adopting the language 
of the state and institutions and leveraging their own capacity to conduct science.
 
2 I draw on selected cases of anti-mining communities and social movements from my fieldwork con-
ducted in the Philippines in 2009 and 2014. The two broad national movements include Alyansa Tigil Mina 
(Alliance to Stop Mining) and Kalikasan (Nature).
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This study fosters a dialogue of political economy, political ecology, and the so-
ciology of labor (Agarwala, 2013; Silver, 2003; Zhang, 2015). Specifically, it shows the 
shifts in the strategies of the mining sector and the subsequent adoption by anti-
mining groups as they become integrated in global circuits of production and con-
sumption (Elias, 2010; Nevins & Peluso, 2008; Ong, 2006). The neoliberal mining 
regime has not only invited capital to open up new lands for extraction (Nevins & 
Peluso, 2008; Ong, 2006; Peluso, 1992), but also generated enormous socio-ecologi-
cal consequences for communities in the mining areas. As political ecology deals with 
the “chains of explanation to exploring marginalized communities” (Peet & Watts, 
2004, p. 3) by situating the environmental problems in a broader context, a study of 
the shifting strategies of mining companies and the later adoption by anti-mining 
communities could further our understanding of the neoliberal restructuring of the 
extractive sector in the Global South.
I follow the tradition of global ethnography pioneered by Micheal Burawoy (1985, 
2013) in order to understand how economic production, state strategies, and local 
histories constitute with, and form through, each other. Numerous scholars have 
presented cutting edge ethnography works on labor in different parts of the world 
but the extractive sector has largely been overlooked (Bickhmam-Mendez, 2005; 
Dreby, 2010; France, 2011; Parrenas, 2015). Though there are some ethnographies on 
mining and development (Kirsch, 2014), I aim to extend an ethnographic approach 
towards the Philippine mining industry to understand how the mining sector and 
anti-mining groups compete for mining outcomes since the neoliberal restructuring 
in 1986. A study of how new state strategies subdued resistance and how the sub-
sequent adaptation of anti-mining communities to neoliberal restructuring has the 
potential to explore how people in precarious situations and informal labor condi-
tions become more empowered social actors under particularly contentious condi-
tions (Peet & Watts, 2004). 
I draw on selected cases of anti-mining communities and social movements from 
my fieldwork in 2014 conducted in the provinces of Camarines Norte, Abra, Moun-
tain Province, Romblon, and Bohol. Through interviews with community leaders, 
representatives of social movements, national and local government officials, and 
spokespersons of transnational mining companies, I attempt to reconstruct the ter-
rains of struggle between the mining sector and the anti-mining groups. First, I de-
velop a theoretical framework that examines neoliberalism as an exception in the 
extractive sector in the Global South. Second, I briefly discuss the Philippine mining 
sector prior to and during the neoliberal period. In the main section of the article, I 
analyze the two strategies that emerged after the shift towards a neoliberal mining 
regime in 1986: technologies of subjection in elevation of national state agencies and 
technologies of subjectivities through the power of industry experts. In both strate-
gies, I briefly discuss how communities have adapted to the new terrain of contesta-
tion.
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NEOLIBERALISM AS AN EXCEPTION: SUBJECTION AND SUBJECTIVITIES  
IN THE EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRY
David Harvey (2005, 2010), one of the prominent Marxist theorists in the 21st centu-
ry, argues that neoliberalism was an elite-led project that successfully reversed capi-
talism’s profitability crisis of the 1970s. Across Western Europe, states experienced 
tightening budgets, staggering economic productivity, and rising labor unrest. These 
conditions pushed political elites to restructure the economy around the principles 
of neoliberalism: privatization of state enterprises, deregulation of goods and ser-
vices, and the liberalization of economic production. Neoliberal elites dismantled 
state regulations and empowered transnational companies across the world. Harvey 
(2006, 2010) also portrays neoliberalism as a knowledge paradigm that empowered 
dominant modes of governance employed by local and national governments, influ-
encing civil society and non-state organizations, capitalizing on the ideological cleav-
ages between labor and social movements, and most pivotally, subsuming economic 
and political elites into the rubrics of neoliberal ideology.
However, the neoliberal restructuring of economies varies across places and eco-
nomic sectors. The extractive industry, a vast, interconnected, and multi-trillion 
dollar heavy sector, occupies a central position in the global neoliberal restructur-
ing of economic production. Mining communities in Africa, Asia, and Latin America 
have resisted mining companies (Kirsch, 2014; Nem Singh & Bourgouin, 2013; Peet & 
Watts, 2004), but the vast networks of corporations facilitate transactions between 
the extractive sector and commodity producers, making the mining companies rela-
tively anonymous and invulnerable to consumer boycotts, inter-state regulatory ef-
forts, and labor unrest (Kirsch, 2014). 
State actors and representatives of the mining sector justified the expansion of 
the industry by emphasizing the need to revitalize the economy and provide em-
ployment. A more recent example of these efforts is the branding of the sector as a 
‘promoter’ of sustainable development (Recidoro, 2013). However, despite such in-
vestments, recent transformations in technology have weakened the employment ca-
pacity and environmental viability of the mining sector. Because mining companies 
rely heavily on machine-heavy, capital-intensive open-pit extraction, which mini-
mizes the use of labor (Kirsch, 2014), they employ fewer permanent laborers and rely 
instead on contractual workers to construct infrastructure and protect them from 
protest politics. Even though capital-intensive mining extracts more minerals, it also 
produces 50 times the waste and tailing vis-à-vis underground extraction (Kirsch, 
2014). Alongside this shift towards capital-intensive mining, the World Bank and the 
Asian Development Bank promoted the liberalization of the formerly protected min-
eral sectors across the world (Bridge, 2004; Camba, 2015). States in the Global South 
amended their mining codes, dismantled labor and environmental protection, and 
provided new institutions to expand mineral extraction (Bridge, 2004). 
To understand the neoliberal restructuring at the local level, Aihwa Ong’s (1999a, 
1999b, 2006) formulation of “neoliberal exceptions” has been a more useful concept 
than macroeconomic theories and institutional approaches. In agreement with Har-
vey’s assessment that neoliberalism empowered the state to implement neoliberal 
reforms, Ong examines the micro-level transformations of governance and govern-
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ing fostered by the global shift towards neoliberal restructuring. Specifically, Ong’s 
framework traces and locates how neoliberalism reconfigures the relationship be-
tween the state and the people, sovereignty and territoriality, as well as power and 
knowledge. She argues that neoliberalism re-conceptualizes state governance as apo-
litical and technical, territories as commodities, and knowledge paradigms as univer-
sally applicable. Ong suggests that states in the Global South need to transform the 
exceptions in their governing practices to compete for foreign direct investments. 
The monopoly of violence, which is the primary repertoire of the state, may attract 
unwanted international scrutiny and embolden resistance movements. Widespread 
use of state violence may also become ineffective due to the considerable costs on 
citizen morale, ideology, international reputation, and social order. In the Philip-
pine mining sector, these practices becomes exceptions because the MGB, NCIP, and 
DENR become efficient agencies to implement neoliberal frameworks. Before re-
structuring, these institutions were inefficient by Western standards and controlled 
by rent-seeking elites, but they were transformed to forward global mining interest. 
Local, rent-seeking elites controlled mining production in the past. Under neoliberal 
restructuring, however, they need to follow the rules of the national government and 
relinquish control of production to the transnational companies. 
In my reformulation of Ong’s argument, neoliberal exceptions divert the terrains 
of struggle from protest in the street to state institutions and industry networks. 
Neoliberal exceptions assemble and constitute the new state strategies of subjection 
and subjectivities. Technologies of subjection regulate the behavior of the governed in 
particular matters of social and economic outcomes (Ong, 2006). These technologies 
not only privileged the MGB, the NCIP, and the DENR to determine and implement 
the procedures aimed at making mining socially accountable, but also monopolized 
important decision-making on mining claims at critical junctures, bypassing and 
ignoring democratic procedures in favor of expediting mining permits for mining 
companies. Furthermore, these institutions limit anti-mining groups within asym-
metric decision making structures, preventing them from deploying other weapons 
in their repertoires. Technologies of subjectivities empower industry experts chosen 
by mining companies to determine the environmental viability of mining projects: 
water pollution, energy usage, mercury pollution, and soil erosion. Members of the 
networks – holders of particular credentials – police the boundaries of their own 
membership, hindering outsiders even with similarly competitive credentials from 
cross-checking their assessments. Not only are these practices dangerous, but they 
also prevent accountability measures by remaining inaccessible and unintelligible to 
the outside. Furthermore, these networks also monopolize the interpretation of par-
ticular modes of dominant knowledge paradigms to occlude other social groups with 
different sets of beliefs (Ong, 1999b, 2006). Environmental assessments neglect and 
do not take into account alternative forms of local and gendered knowledge (Nevins 
& Peluso, 2008; Peet & Watts, 2004), obscuring the concerns of indigenous com-
munities, labor organizations, farmers, and environmental groups. Technologies of 
subjection by state agencies minimize anti-mining resistance through the emergence 
of state-led consultations and official registration. Technologies of subjectivities, in 
the form of industry networks, go hand-in-hand with the technologies of subjection, 
casting a cover of scientific legitimacy, accuracy, and neutrality onto the decision-
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making structures of state institutions. Both technologies of subjection and subjec-
tivities enable and deny options for the mining sector and anti-mining groups. These 
technologies not only assume that all governed citizens are and should be liberal sub-
jects that can decide freely, manage rationally, and survive independently, but also 
privilege the role of state institutions that exalts the currency of economic, social, 
and cultural capital. For actors to successfully impede state power and the scientific 
credential, movements must therefore acquire the necessary economic, social, and 
cultural capital. Economic capital, in terms of access to law firms, information, and 
local officials, prefigures the outcomes of many legal cases across the world. Access 
to social and cultural capital, such as educational attainment and scientific literacy, 
increases the credibility of the actors. Indeed, cultural capital at many times becomes 
the ‘proxy’ for an empirically reflexive, careful scientific examination of processes. 
Because of the nature of the structures and rules of these institutions and networks, 
local communities and resistance movements ultimately lose out as a result of the 
mismatch of their strategies and tactics.
FROM THE COLONIAL TO THE NEOLIBERAL MINING REGIME
This section presents a critical historical overview of Philippine mineral industry: 
late colonial (1901-1941), national developmental (1945-1964), and state authoritari-
anism (1965-1985). I present the historical development of Philippine mining to show 
the key changes under the current neoliberal mineral regime (1986-present). In the 
colonial mineral regime, the US army ravaged the mountainous provinces of the non-
hispanized Philippine provinces. The Northern Mountain Province and Moro regions 
in Mindanao were targeted because the previous colonizer, the Spanish government, 
had never controlled them. By 1903, a colonial mineral law was passed and over five 
hundred foreign investors applied to explore and extract minerals and export them 
to the global market. In 1921, the Philippines evolved as a major gold exporter, which 
shipped a total amount of USD 3,217,843 during that year (Camba, 2015). After the 
Great Depression, the US economy needed nickel, chromium, iron, and zinc from 
the Philippines to manufacture products and build infrastructure under the state-led 
New Deal program. Near the end of the 1930s, there were 19 large mineral infra-
structures owned by major foreign mining companies and more than five hundred 
smaller companies that operated a thousand mines of various size. These mines di-
rectly employed approximately 75,000 laborers and hundreds of thousands of other 
people for supporting auxiliary work. In 1940, the Philippines exported precious and 
gold metals worth USD 39,229,352 (Camba, 2015). In the course of this expansion, 
hundreds of communities were dispossessed of their lands and waves of soil ero-
sion and deforestation occurred, while Philippine elites consolidated political and 
economic power (Camba, 2015). As mining operations expanded across the coun-
try, approximately 50,000-75,000 Filipinos were turned into laborers for the mining 
industry. This transformation expanded their power as they occupied a position at 
the point of production.3 Protest and resistance could, at times, stop mineral-related 
3 Beverly Silver’s (2003) Forces of Labor and Lu Zhang’s (2015) Inside China’s Automobile Factories argue 
that labor’s position at the point of production empower them to resist exploitation and bargain for better 
conditions.
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operations and induce conflict in these mines (Camba, 2015). Before World War II, 
numerous rallies and strikes occurred in the major mining companies of Benguet 
and Lepanto, and at the Marsman Corporation, which increased the cost of labor 
for companies (American Chamber of Commerce, 1937, 1939a, 1939b; Brimo, 1953, 
1961). Labor started to acquire more attention from the state, but the interruption of 
war delayed working hour regulations and other demands into the post-war period. 
Though laborers and peasant organizations fought for different reasons, they both 
mobilized and campaigned against the colonial mineral regime (American Chamber 
of Commerce, 1937, 1939a, 1939b).
After World War II, during the national mining period (1945-1964), the capacity of 
workers to stop production by leaving their work and taking the fight to the streets 
had limited the mining industry’s ability to capitalize on cheap labor. The mineral 
industry maintained steady profits, but could not bring back the conditions of profit-
ability from the 1930s. The Philippine senate and congress mandated the industry 
to pay the minimum wage and threatened to impose taxes on mining licenses, cor-
porate tax, and real estate, making the political and economic situation for mining 
companies more costly (Sanders, 1963). 
As domestic business interests purchased most of the major mining companies 
during the 1950s, Filipino-owned mining companies such as Benguet, Atlas, Mar-
copper, Lepanto, and Philex began to export minerals mainly to Japan (Alyansa Tigil 
Mina, 2010; Orfenio, 2009). But it was only under Ferdinand Marcos (1965-1986) that 
the state sought to extract state revenues from the mining industry and subsequently 
altered the rules of the game in favor of large-scale mining (Lopez, 1992; Orfenio, 
2009). The state supported the capitalization of domestic firms and aggressively pro-
moted mineral exploration in peripheral regions. From a passive, non-interventionist 
policy framework based on the colonial treaties arranged with the US, Marcos shift-
ed the mining regime towards an “active, state-led” development model in 1974. He 
enacted Presidential Decree 464, which favored established business interests that 
could mobilize financial resources to explore, develop, and exploit minerals. The ac-
tive promotion of large-scale domestic capital, however, also meant restricting the 
rules of foreign ownership (e.g., a cap of 40% equity ownership in companies), there-
by effectively preventing the entry of foreign mining companies (Lopez, 1992). 
During the national and the Marcos period, communities were able to strike a bar-
gain with the state and domestic capital through the political conditions of that time. 
For example, the Benguet Mining Corporation provided workers with a fair share of 
compensation in health benefits, education plans, and retirement packages in return 
for their labor and support (M. Dempte Baluda, Geological Society of the Philippines, 
Quezon City, 3 April 2010). Provincial officials in Benguet recognized Marcos’ rule 
in exchange for some level of autonomy over economic production. Protest politics 
and various strategies limited the capacity of the state and capital to expand mineral 
operations. The Ikelahans in Nueva Vizcaya, for example, resisted Marcos’ plans to 
transform the province into a giant tourist city (D. de Vera, executive director, Philip-
pine Association for Intercultural Development, Quezon City, 6 June 2014). 
The key point is that the incorporation of workers into the developing mining 
economy simultaneously increased their power to protest and resist exploitation. 
Despite the US colonial and Marcos regimes’ monopoly over the use of force, the 
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need to maintain legitimacy and keep ties to the provincial elites limited the use of 
military violence. There were certainly human rights violations and the impunity 
of violence, but they were concentrated on the anti-Marcos activist groups, Islamic 
separatist movements, the New People’s Army, and the oppositional political parties. 
The fall of Marcos paved the way for neoliberal restructuring at the beginning 
of Corazon Aquino’s presidency (1986-1992). The post-Marcos governments con-
solidated the neoliberal model in the context of political instability and economic 
indebtedness. In 1987, Corazon Aquino approved the National Economic and De-
velopment Authority’s Medium-Term Philippine Development Plan (1987-1992) that 
stressed the role of foreign companies in national recovery by dismantling state mo-
nopolies. Furthermore, she adopted the Executive Order (EO) 266 – an investment 
omnibus code – and strengthened administrative reforms (Bowie & Unger, 1997). EO 
266 awarded generous tax holidays, duty-free import, and tax exemption for the first 
five years for any foreign investment (Orfenio, 2009). Beyond shifting the principle of 
land ownership away from the traditional leasehold system, the new code regarded 
the state as the initial tender that would treat land as a commodity for mineral explo-
ration and extraction.
President Fidel Ramos (1992-1997) embraced sweeping liberal economic reforms 
as a way of catching up with the country’s neighboring Asian tigers. In particular, 
he secured multilateral investment treaties and promoted privatization of public 
services. President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (2001-2009), during her period as sena-
tor, was the principal author of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 (RA 7942), which 
became the state’s answer to foreign mining investors’ demands to reduce uncer-
tainties in the extractive industries (Orfenio, 2009; Vivoda, 2008). At the same time, 
more progressive political reforms were implemented, for example, the recognition 
of indigenous peoples’ rights through the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 and 
the decentralization of power towards local government units to strengthen regional 
autonomy especially in mineral-rich Mindanao. The neoliberal restructuring trans-
formed the power of the mining sector over anti-mining organizations through shift-
ing the terrains of struggle from the streets to the domain of state institutions: the 
passive NCIP, the pro-mining stance of the MGB, and the conflicting interest of the 
DENR, as well as the power of industry experts in deciding a mining project’s envi-
ronmental viability. This is discussed in the following section.
TECHNOLOGIES OF SUBJECTION: ELEVATION OF STATE INSTITUTIONS
To begin with, the 1995 Mining Act has been shown to have weak mechanisms for lo-
cal communities (together with civil society organizations) to channel their grievanc-
es towards state institutions. The expansion of large-scale mining has delegated the 
safeguards for political consent and social acceptability to the NCIP and the DENR. 
The primary instruments of local accountability in the mining industry are the social 
acceptability clause for barangays aided by local governments and the process of Free, 
Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) for indigenous peoples groups facilitated by the 
NCIP. More importantly, the social acceptability clause and FPIC are susceptible to 
self-interested individuals in mining, leading to numerous allegations that both con-
sultation processes are largely hollow (congressional staff, Committee on National 
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Communities, Quezon City, 19 October 2013). Some problems identified by critics 
include the arbitrary selection of barangay captains or new leaders in the indigenous 
communities who are supportive of large-scale mining, the numerous consultations 
with the communities until they acquiesce to mining, the treatment of minority sup-
port from few members of the community as majority vote or consent, and the lack 
of specific procedures for the FPIC that subject the consent-building process to mul-
tiple and often competing interpretations (R. Halip, Asia Indigenous Peoples Pact, 
Bangkok, 12 June 2014). Because of the numerous, repetitive, and arbitrary consulta-
tion procedures, multinational firms and local elites are given opportunity to exploit 
the social acceptability clause of the FPIC process, pushing numerous communities 
to acquiesce to mineral industry demands.
Though NCIP and local governments weaken the acts of protest in the streets and 
constitute the legitimacy of due process to determine mining outcomes, indigenous 
people face more inhumane kinds of historical and contemporary violence. To be-
gin with, the Mining Act fails to delineate government land, ancestral domains, and 
protected areas, on the one hand, and appropriates land with mining potential for 
exploitation, on the other hand. Using the absence of documentary evidence as an 
excuse, state agencies have weakened indigenous peoples’ claim to systematic ances-
tral domain, landownership, and property protection (congressional staff, Commit-
tee on National Communities, 19 October 2013). According to a policy paper from the 
Samdhana Institute (2011), the NCIP funnelled the majority of its budget to educa-
tion, health, and development projects for indigenous peoples. The main responsi-
bilities of protecting ancestral land from outsiders, registering landownership, and 
systematizing ancestral land domains were ignored. Around 60% of the budget went 
to the salaries of personnel and only 40% went to administrative expenses and pro-
grams for indigenous people. From 2006 to 2009, only 17% was channelled directly 
to indigenous peoples and intercultural communities, which paid for scholarships, 
trainings, health programs, livelihood, and legal services. Instead of recognizing in-
digenous peoples’ legitimate right to their lands, the NCIP became a container of 
poverty. Furthermore, the mining companies pay for the FPIC procedures them-
selves, which undermines the NCIP’s capacity to facilitate FPIC. If mining companies 
supplement the income of underpaid NCIP officials to conduct the FPIC process, 
the process becomes a conflict of interest that erodes the legitimacy of the NCIP and 
the Philippine government (Samdhana Institute, 2011). There is currently no single 
standard for financial transparency regarding the transfer of finances from the min-
ing companies to the NCIP, making it difficult for anti-mining groups to acquire in-
formation and documentary evidence regarding the unfair situation. The refusal of 
indigenous people to participate in the preparation of NCIP’s budget exacerbates the 
situation, accentuating the institutional rigidities of state agencies and the marginal-
ized political participation of those in the peripheries. 
While the budget was channelled mainly to salaries, the overall state budget al-
location for the NCIP was arguably inadequate. NCIP officials bemoan their inability 
to do their duties properly because of the lack of financial support from the govern-
ment. In 2004, NCIP provincial officers were paid around USD 210 every month. For 
instance, Attorney Jake Dumala, an NCIP officer in the southern province of Davao 
del Norte, said that they end up using their own vehicles, salaries, and time while 
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their support for indigenous groups “is being hampered by their meagre budget” (Ala-
ma, 2004). Dumala appealed for a small increase “for travel allowances to better serve 
our Lumad brothers, an IP group in the South, who are almost living in far-flung 
areas” (Alama, 2004), but the Philippine government did not give them any finan-
cial redress. In 2015, the results of the NCIP’s failure to protect indigenous people 
in Davao del Norte became clear. The Lumads, the major indigenous group in the 
province, started to evacuate their lands due to the fighting between leftist groups 
and the Philippine military. The clashes were reportedly over potential mineral lands 
that mining companies wanted to open up. 
Another research conducted by academics from the University of the Philippines 
Baguio (UPB) complements the Samdhana study. During the four-day gathering of 
indigenous peoples in 2011, the UP Baguio academics suggested that the NCIP’s bud-
get management and internal financial mechanisms have been faulty, inefficient, and 
wasteful (Sinumlag, 2011). They showed that the NCIP has received donations from 
international donors and direct funding from the Department of Budget and Man-
agement, but has had “unliquidated cash advances worth P 36.6 million, as well as an 
additional P 9.5 million” since 1997 (Sinumlag, 2011). The research also indicated that 
the NCIP has been significantly quicker to grant FPIC approval for mining companies 
than to issue Certificates of Ancestral Domain Titles (CADT) and Ancestral Domain 
Sustainable Development and Protection Plans (ADSDPP). Indigenous people need 
to have titles registered in NCIP for the legal protection of their lands. Since the for-
mation of the NCIP in 1997, it has only granted a total of 159 CADT and 89 ADSDPP 
in contrast to 312 FPIC approvals (Sinumlag, 2011). Indigenous people who failed to 
register their lands with the NCIP (or where the NCIP was too slow) were not given 
the right to participate in the FPIC process, which led to expedited mineral appli-
cations, exploratory mineral testing, and numerous other operations (congressional 
staff, Committee on National Communities, 19 October 2013).
My own fieldwork shows that the FPIC process gives the leader or the council of 
the indigenous peoples the freedom to choose what kind of operation to allow and 
under which conditions (Alyansa Tigil Mina, 2010; National Commission on Indige-
nous People [NCIP], 2012; Philippine Congress, 2013). However, questions of leader-
ship and location of ancestral domains remained vague. The law not only prefigures 
a liberal logic, reducing people to individual subjects with ‘free’ choices like consum-
ers in markets, but also violently abstracts the historically tenuous experience of the 
autonomous indigenous peoples from the ‘sin’ of Philippine nation state formation. 
However, the inadequacy of the NCIP does not come as a surprise. From 1997 
until 2011, the NCIP was under the office of the Department of Environment and 
Natural Resources. What is striking is that the ministry in charge of protecting the 
environment is also the state agency responsible for signing and approving mining 
leases. In other words, the neoliberal policy framework brought together irreconcil-
able objectives within a weak state that created frictions within the bureaucracy. In 
2011, the NCIP was finally transferred to the Office of the President and mandated 
to formulate new FPIC guidelines (NCIP, 2012). Some state actors have said that in 
the first 10 years of the NCIP, the state barely gave support to fund the FPIC. For 
example, a local government official in Cotabato City reported that the NCIP only 
had a staff of four people and an annual budget of USD 3,000 for traveling to remote 
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areas, supporting indigenous peoples’ livelihoods, and conducting counter studies 
(congressional staff, committee on National Communities, 19 October 2013). Many 
supporters of the anti-mining groups know of the NCIP’s historical inability to pro-
tect indigenous peoples. In a privilege speech given to the 15th Philippine Congress, 
representative Teddy Brawner Baguilat (2011) said:
The government’s obsession for ‘mining at all costs’ stems from the perpetu-
ation of Executive Order No. 270-A, issued on January 2004, which provided 
for guiding principles for the revitalization of the mining industry. This EO 
has led government agencies to violate indigenous peoples’ right to free prior 
and informed consent recognized in the IPRA [Indigenous Peoples Rights Act] 
but undermined by none other than the National Commission on Indigenous 
Peoples (NCIP) with their issuance and implementation of the 2006 NCIP gui-
delines on FPIC, which has been criticized by indigenous peoples’ leaders and 
their support groups, more favourable to mining corporations and violative of 
the right to self-determination of the indigenous peoples. . . . Another observed 
cause of conflict is the flawed or defective implementation of the free prior 
and informed consent requirement for indigenous peoples. In many cases, re-
gulating agencies either bypass this requirement or the implementing agency 
in connivance with companies manipulated the acquisition of consent of the 
affected communities.
At the end of the speech, Baguilat (2011) called on “President Simeon Benigno 
Aquino III to immediately issue an executive order calling for the moratorium while 
we are in the process of improving our mining policies”. 
In sum, technologies of subjection elevated the NCIP and the DENR to elect and 
select processes to protect barangays and indigenous people by (1) disengaging from 
social conflict; (2) abetting the mining sector over indigenous people and barangays; 
and (3) denying state support to effectively protect indigenous peoples from outside 
actors.
TECHNOLOGIES OF SUBJECTIVITIES: THE RISE OF INDUSTRY EXPERTS 
Technologies of subjectivities empower industry experts and constrain public par-
ticipation in emerging scientific networks. To begin with, the 1995 Mining Act re-
quires the DENR to implement pre-extraction monitoring measures (Environmental 
Work Program, Environmental Compliance Certificate, Environmental Protection 
and Enhancement Program). Mining companies also need to submit post-extraction 
measures (Final Rehabilitation and Decommissioning Plan). Apart from these mining 
specific policies, several other laws (e.g., the National Integrated Protected Areas Act 
or the Wildfire Resource Conservation Act) reinforce environmental protection (Ro-
villos et al., 2003). After the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), mining com-
panies need to acquire an Environmental Compliance Certificate from the DENR. 
The Environmental Management Bureau of the DENR together with the Mine Envi-
ronmental Protection and Enhancement Office review proposals and create an Envi-
ronmental Assessment Review Committee to conduct scheduled inspections, public 
hearings, and open house testing of environmental impacts. Within 120 days, the 
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proponents of the project need to submit the EIA to the Environmental Management 
Bureau. Unless explicitly rejected, the proposal is considered accepted. After submit-
ting the EIA, the Provincial Environmental Board of local governments needs to veri-
fy the study through various standards. Pro-mining local governments delegate their 
members to the provincial board, keeping anti-mining groups away from important 
positions of influence. Membership in the board requires political connections, eco-
nomic resources, and social capital in the provinces. In case indigenous peoples pro-
test against the result of the EIA, their grievances go through the NCIP’s regional 
heading office instead of the indigenous peoples’ own socio-political systems.
Criticism on the procedures of the EIA has been widely voiced. The requirements 
of public information have been narrowed, the processing timeframes reduced, and 
the decision-making concentrated to the Environmental Management Bureau (Ro-
villos et al., 2003). Mining companies conduct the EIA themselves by contracting 
industry experts. Since the mining company pays for the EIA, the contactor-payee 
relationship spawns doubt on the authenticity, sincerity, and neutrality of the study. 
Industry experts rely on the mining companies to pay for their services, producing 
a perverse incentive to present a rosy picture of the mining project and erode the 
findings of the EIA (congressional staff, committee on National Communities, 19 Oc-
tober 2013). With civil society organizations and communities unable to participate 
in adjudicating and externally verifying the findings, the EIA becomes an ineffective 
tool to protect barangays and indigenous peoples (M. Diego, Mangyan Taga-Bukid, 
Atsmata Indigenous Group, Quezon City, 6 June 2014).
The dynamics amongst industry experts, juridical procedures, and the mining 
companies constrain the opposition of indigenous peoples and social movements. 
NCIP’s regional offices and the Provincial Regional Courts act as the institutional 
mechanisms for hearing indigenous peoples’ grievances. The regional offices work 
like a regular trial court and quickly facilitate cases and favor those who have political 
connections to the local governments (congressional staff, committee on National 
Communities, 19 October 2013). In some cases, members of the local government 
bodies hunger for the potential foreign direct investments in the mining sector, be-
lieving in credentials of industry experts and deferring to their understanding of the 
soil, wind patterns, water bodies, and many others (former local government unit 
staff, Bayombong, 26 June 2014). Both courts subsequently dismissed alternative gov-
erning standards, such as respect for ancestral domains and indigenous peoples’ live-
lihoods, as backward, superstitious, and ‘anti-development’. They lack the capacity to 
conduct their own independent studies and externally check the findings of industry 
experts, constraining the effectiveness of the procedures (D. de Vera, 6 June 2014). 
Even when trials take place, they require year-long attendance in the courts of 
the provincial capital (D. de Vera, 6 June 2014). While mining companies can access 
expensive law firms that have a firm grip on the legal system of the land and the pa-
tronage networks across the country, civil society organizations, local communities, 
and indigenous groups need to pool their financial and social resources together in 
order to attend the trials (D. de Vera, 6 June 2014). Since many of these people rely on 
cultivating their land for livelihood, they gruelingly need to adjust their schedule to 
accommodate the court trials (T. Fernando Daing, indigenous group leader, Quezon 
City, 18 June 2014). It may be convenient for mining company officials to drive to 
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the courthouse from their hotels but it takes half a day for indigenous peoples’ lead-
ers to walk from their lands to the provincial capital (D. de Vera, 6 June 2014). Time 
taken away from farming and put into court attendance disrupts livelihoods and the 
already limited material reproduction of indigenous peoples. The courts neglect the 
asymmetric economic and political conditions between indigenous peoples and min-
ing companies, ostensibly treating them as equal before the law. 
In the province of Nueva Vizcaya, the regional branch of the Mines and Geosci-
ences Bureau approved a mineral exploration permit prior to the company’s FPIC 
process. Titan Mining Corporation, the mining applicant, at that time, bypassed the 
FPIC process with the Ikelahans, the main indigenous group in the province (former 
local government unit staff, 26 June 2014). The Nueva Vizcaya branch of the bureau 
ostensibly gave the final permit even if it did not have the power to do so because 
of the size of the potential mining area. Instead of scrutinizing the application, the 
bureau’s main office in Manila quickly approved the permit in less than 30 days (D. de 
Vera, 6 June 2014). Other concerns such as the ancestral domain, community beliefs, 
and livelihood concerns were deemed irrelevant to national development (M. Diego, 
6 June 2014). The Ikelahans were unable to present a viable environmental study to 
the bureau to rebut the findings of Titan Mining Corporation (D. de Vera, 6 June 
2014).
The Tampakan mining project in South Cotabato – with USD 5.8 billion the big-
gest investment in the Philippine mining sector – serves as another example. The 
project exists in a quad-boundary with three other provinces: Agusan del Sur, Davao 
del Sur, and Sultan Kudarat. According to local government unit staff, SMI-Xstra-
ta, the mining applicant, submitted a tampered and incomplete EIA, which lacked 
geographic simulation information of the river basins of the surrounding provinc-
es. Regardless of the incomplete and manipulated data of the report, the ‘expertise’ 
and credentials of the industry experts railroaded the mining application through 
the Provincial Environmental Board, the Mines and Geosciences Bureau, and the 
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (former local government unit 
staff, 26 June 2014). In a meeting facilitated by the state, SMI-Xstrata used the impec-
cable scientific studies and the projected monetary gain to justify the project. Exclu-
sive membership in the industry networks and the state support enabled the mining 
companies to manufacture studies on the environmental viability of their operations. 
Technologies of subjectivities enabled them to bypass the ancestral knowledge of the 
indigenous groups that was framed as suppositious and premodern. 
Though technologies of subjection and subjectivities weaken opposition, anti-
mining groups began to adapt their strategies to limit the mining sector’s growing 
power (F. Sevilla, policy and research officer, Alyansa Tigil Mina, Quezon City, 19 
June 2014). Groups started to build broad, multi-sectoral alliances amongst inter-
ested parties. The Ikelahans not only protested in the streets in Manila and contested 
the legality of the mining application in the court, but also contacted legislators and 
other social movements to pressure relevant state institutions.4 The Ikelahans con-
tacted the local parliamentary representatives and key allies in congress that led to 
4 After their experience of protesting against the incursions of the Marcos regime, descendants of the 
Ikelahans moved to white-collar careers in law and medicine in the cities. Some of their members acquired 
their own networks to contest the Titan Mining Corporation (D. de Vera, 6 June 2014).
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several interventions from congressional representatives, which pressured the DENR 
to retract the mining application due to shaky conditions. Subsequently, and in a pos-
sible act of vengeance, Titan Mining Corporation sued the Ikelahan leaders for libel 
and economic sabotage that led to year-long and costly meetings for the indigenous 
peoples: legal harassments, court hearings, meetings in the cities, and arbitrations 
(former local government unit staff, 26 June 2014). Furthermore, anti-mining groups 
started to expand their capacity to conduct studies to counter the industry experts 
of mining companies. Despite political support from the former president Gloria 
Macapagal’s administration to the Tampakan project, a provincial referendum was 
organized by the national government, local governments, and civil society mem-
bers to vote on mineral extraction. Social movements and peoples’ organizations 
believed that the mining firm and the national government deliberately presented 
an incomplete, manipulated, and biased scientific assessment. Their suspicions were 
exacerbated by the government’s refusal to make the controversial EIA available to 
anti-mining groups (D. de Vera, 6 June 2014). Through the support of local people’s 
organizations, various indigenous peoples and national organizations such as Aly-
ansa Tigil Mina (ATM) and the Philippine Association for Intercultural Development 
(PAFID), conducted a counter assessment of the project. PAFID’s study, supported 
by Cambridge-based geologists, challenged the study made by SDMI-Tampakan and 
proved that SDMI-Xtrata’s study did not take the implications on the river basins of 
the surrounding provinces into account. The results of the provincial referendum 
united initially undecided local government officials, local barangays and indigenous 
peoples in four provinces to take a firm anti-mining position (D. Arias, campaign and 
advocacy officer, Alyansa Tigil Mina, Quezon City, 19 June 2014). Hence, the anti-
mining vote won through the referendum culminated in one of the most contro-
versial moratorium in the country (P. Macling Malayao, spokesperson, Kalipunan ng 
mga Katutubong Mamayan ng Pilipinas, Quezon City, 15 June 2014). Australian in-
vestors of the Tampakan mining project, industry experts from the DENR and MGB, 
Chamber of Mines, and national government officials were disappointed but had to 
relent to the referendum’s decision. Hence, anti-mining groups have started to use 
the language of science against industry experts of the mining companies. 
CONCLUSION
Using Ong’s concept of neoliberal exceptions, this article discussed the changing 
terrains of struggle in contemporary Philippine mining. I argued that the transition 
to a neoliberal mineral regime has empowered the mining sector and weakened the 
anti-mining groups through two new governing strategies. First, technologies of 
subjection have elevated state mining institutions to choose and put into effect the 
processes aimed at addressing the demands of local communities. Second, technolo-
gies of subjectivities have privileged a selected group of industry experts to narrowly 
arbitrate the environmental viability of mining projects with little external review. 
Because of the mining capital’s access to economic and legal resources, anti-mining 
communities across the Philippines have been forced to compete on an unequal ter-
rain for a meaningful social dialogue and mining outcomes. With allies in state insti-
tutions and science at their behest, the subjection of the institutions and subjectivi-
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ties of science become seemingly incontestable spaces for the opponents of mining. 
The mining sector has been able to marginalize community concerns such as ances-
tral domains, social justice, and community subjectivities through the monopoly of, 
and skewed access to, the power of state institutions and the credentials of industry 
experts. 
There are three concrete findings for the Philippines. First, state policies should 
consider expanding civil society, social movement, and community participation 
in state mining institutions. Communities faced abusive policy decisions from the 
mining sector and state institutions as a result of the lack of checks and safeguards. 
Successful mining cases in Chile, Brazil, and Indonesia were built on state-society 
compromises. Specifically, civil society organizations occupied important roles in the 
mining sectors of these states. Second, anti-mining communities should continue to 
invest in capacity to counter the mining sector in their terrain: state institutions and 
scientific assessments. The bigger danger to communities is the incomprehensible 
nature of the mining sector’s new weapons within the neoliberal era. Movements 
across the world must continue to shift their strategies alongside the continuing 
transformation of global capitalism. And last, postcolonial development in the Phil-
ippines must be inclusive and just for those who have been abandoned by the state for 
decades. Indigenous peoples have been the most abused and neglected group from 
the Spanish regime until today. It is not fair for the mining sector and the state to 
transform their governing strategies just for the sake of competitive advantage. A 
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